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·THE LIMITS OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN GLOBAL CONFLICTS

Next month, Russians from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok will go to the voting
booth in the first presidential election there since the break-up.of the Soviet Union. Of
course, as much of the world worries about the election's outcome, we must remember
that a scant ten years ago, none of us would have imagined that the results of a
democratic election would be our greatest concern about Russia.
There is no better metaphor for. the dramatic changes in the world over the past
.decade than these historic elections. The Berlin Wall has fallen .. Democracies have
begun to blossom around the globe in previously infertile ground.
Yet, with all the promise and potential blessings of this new era, old and new
forms of instability are loose in the world. Ethnic tensions, once repressed by the
strategic challenges of the Cold War, have been unleashed with a fury. Most of the
violent tragedies of the post-Cold War era have resulted from civil strife, not from
aggression between nation-states.
This transformation requires the United States to retool our foreign policy
efforts. Our interest in a stable and productive community of nations remains
substantial, as America's integration with the rest. of the world is at an all-time high.
We are il}e world's lone military superpower. Nonetheless, we do not face a challenge
of the magnitude of the Cold War.
During the Cold War, our basic security and way of life were at stake. Hence,
President Kennedy could say in his inaugural address that "we shall pay any price, bear
any burden, -meet any hardship, support·any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the
.survival and success of liberty." In 1961 the stakes were that high. Fortunately, that is.
no longer true. We must remain heavily engaged in the world, but the challenges of
the post-Soviet world no longer require us to 'pay any price' or 'bear any burden'.

We must seek a new balance of objectives in foreign affairs that reflects
common sense. Finding this new balance is of particular importance in deciding when
to send our fighting men and women into harm's way. After the tragic Lebanon
debacle of 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, laid out a set of guidelines
to govern U.S. military intervention abroad. The "Weinberger Principles" demonstrate
the importance of setting clear and thoughtful guidelines to govern the overseas
deployment of American troops. While Secretary Weinberger's guidelines may no
longer fully apply in the context of the ethnic conflicts plaguing the world today, it was
, in the spirit of those principles that I set out my own test for U.S. military
deployments.
My test has 5 parts:
First - Is there a vital U.S. national interest at stake?
Second - Will our troops be pursuing clear U.S. military and policy objectives?
Third - Is there a timetable and strategy for achieving those objectives?
Fourth - Is there an appropriate exit strategy?
and Finally - Will the American public support our policy initiatives?
I originally laid out this five-point test last June, when the Senate Foreign
Relations committee held its- first hearings about a potential·Bosnia deployment. The
repeated inability of the administration to even begin to satisfy this test for over six
months compelled my vote against sending America's military men and women to
Bosnia last December.
There are probably as many definitions of "vital national interest" in this room
as there are people. Broadly defined, however, vital national interests are those that
have a direct political or economic effect on the nation. For instance, threats to
American strategic assets--oil, shipping lanes, strategic allies--represent a "clear and
present danger" to the United States. Likewise, hostile encroachment into a region of
traditional American influence would be a matter of "vital national interest".

The administration's justification for its Bosnia deployment rested ontwo
supposed U~S. interests: preventing the conflict from spreading and maintaining the
credibility of NATO. Regarding the possible expansion of hostilities, the
administration gave conflicting statements. Various officials claimed that a full-scale
Balkan War was a "likelihood", a "strong possibility" and a "reatdanger". At the
. same time, however, Secretary of State Christopher stated that all parties were
. suffering from· "battle fatigue". Administration officials admonished those who
· opposed its policy to learn the lessons of 1914. Yet, no serious student of World War I
would accept such an analogy.
As for maintaining the credibility of NATO, well, the credibility of NATO was
not at stake until the President declared itto be so. ·That is·no way to make foreign
policy. More importantly, the credibility of NATO, while important, is not an inherent
vital interest of the United States. NATO is a means. NATO is not an end in itself.
The second test for U.S. deployment.is that our troops must have clearly
defined military and policy objectives. Five months into the Bosnia deployment such
objectives are·difficult to find. Our troops are essentially·in Bosnia·to stand betweeµ
the two sides. That is not a ·military mission· and it may be a fool's mission. On the
political side it is an open question about whether we are fully neutral or supporting the
Mu.slim government.
Our troops are·supposedly neutral peace-keepers, yet we bombed Serb positions
to bring about a peace. We have pledged to help arm the Muslim government during
the so-called peace process. And now we, and the Serbs, have learned, while our
troops are on the ground, that the administration secretly approved Iranian arms
shipments to Bosnia during an international arms embargo. Under these circumstance,
would the Serbs be unreasonable in questioning our neutrality? Let us remember that
the operations in Lebanon and Somalia turned sour precisely because one side perceived
that the United States had ceased being a neutral broker.

Third, we must have a strategy and a general timetable for achieving our
objectives. These two must complement each other, with the strategy determining the
timetable. Unfortunately, the administration has a timetable, without a strategy. By
setting an arbitrary one-year timetable, the administration allowed the calendar to drive
policy, not vice-versa as it should be.
This problem also relates to the fourth part of the test: developing an
•· appropriate exit strategy. We want to ensure that an.operation is not open-ended; that
our troops will go, do their job and come home. I would challenge anyone in the
administration to answer this question about the Bosnia operation: How will we know
when the work of our troops is done?
Finally, there is the question of whether the American people support a
deployment. Of course, I don't mean that a President's foreign policy should be driven
solely by public opinion. Presidents often must demonstrate leadership and lead public
opinion. But a President must be able to make a compelling case to the American
people as to why he wants to send their sons and daughters into harm's way. Not only
was President Clinton unable to do this, but he started trying too late. Only after he
had committed troops did he make a public appeal. This process should have started
months earlier.
So my test is fairly straight-forward. It is only a framework, not a perfect
equation. But it does provide a general set of guidelines for decision-making. That
allows for clear thinking about how to adapt to the contingencies of a specific situation.
Let me address a few other points that have been raised by proponents of the
Bosnia deployment. They argue, that as the world's lone remaining superpower, the
United States has a duty to give our fair share to these operations. Yet, ask the almost
90,000 U.S. troops in the Pacific rim if we give our share. Ask the more than 128,000
U.S. troops in the European theater if we are doing our part for world security. The
United States sacrificed in unprecedented ways during the Cold War by providing

security for the free world in the global struggle against Communism. Since the Cold
War ended, we have continued to make a disproportionate effort to guarantee the
stability of the international community.
So we have not shirked our responsibilities to the world. Rather we have
consistently filled the world's greatest responsibility. And when we expend our. scarce
I

military resources on peripheral interests we limit our ability to affect t~e fundamental .
•issues of security and prosperity around the globe.

I

We need to avoid ill-defined missions that do not serve a clear Jational interest

I
i

specifically to avoid an isolationist tum in this country. If American tr6ops begin
losing their lives during an operation that we cannot explain clearly on the grounds of
!

national interest, it will become increasingly difficult to rally public support for future
i

operations. Even ones that are essential to America's national' security·/ In years past
we called this the "Vietnam Syndrome", which paralyzed our foreign irivolvement for
· almost two decades·. It would be tragic if, in the years to come, we arelparalyzed by a
I

"Bosnia Syndrome."
I mentioned earlier the. upcoming historic election in Russia, and there is a
valuable lesson to.be learned from how the Russians rea<;hed this stage. Russia is a
nascent democracy because we won the Cold War. But we did not win the Cold War
with our military might. Rather it was our ideas that prevailed. That is a point we
need to keep in mind when thinking about the future of the Balkans. Far too often,
when we use our military abroad, the contribution we can make to a country with our
political, cultural and even religious heritage gets pushed aside. Our greatest export is
not our military might. Our greatest exports are our ideas. The rapid technological
advances of the communications age make this a particularly ripe time to send our ideas
abroad. We know that underground videotapes helped to spread the ideals of Western
democracy among the citizens of Eastern Europe in the 1980s, and the market for these
ideas continues to explode. We must make sure that our preoccupation with our

I
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military deployment in Bosnia does not cause us to overlook the more valuable
contributions we can make.
Beyond our political and cultural institutions, our unsurpassed know-how and
experience in the economic realm can also serve the people of Bosnia. Regardless of
what we give in foreign assistance or in commitments of troops, in the long run
economic trade holds the real key to rebuilding the Balkans and mending. other areas of
global conflict. I truly commend the efforts of the late Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown, who tragically lost his life trying to foster American investment·in this worntom region.
For years, we in the West have been guided by the hope and the belief that in
the main economically prosperous people--or nations--do not generally engage in selfdefeating aggression or wars. Acting on such beliefs we have poured billions of dollars
into international aid programs and foreign assistance. For instance, in an effort to
build peace, the President has pledged $200 million in construction assistance to Bosnia
together with millions of dollars in similar help from other nations. Bosnia's hoped for
peace is also supported by our millions of dollars in contributions to various.
international agencies including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank and others.
However, as much as many people believe in foreign assistance, I harken back
to Ronald Reagan's adage about domestic policy to the effect that 'the best welfare
program in the world is a job.' Carrying that philosophy over into the international
arena, trade--not aid--is the best tool for bringing about global stability and security.
Unfortunately, the federal government has made it extremely difficult--not to mention
inefficient--for American companies to trade overseas.
_The government's international trade assistance efforts for American companies
are spread among 14 different departments and agencies. For a Missouri business
seeking overseas opportunities, such unwieldy and duplicative bureaucracy forms an

almost indecipherable maze. I have been working on a proposal to consolidate our
efforts in this area. By doing so we can ensure a more coordinated approach, that will
better serve American business, as well as doing more to help areas such as Bosnia that
so desperately need investment.
But even those who believe that foreign assistance--not trade--is the key to
global stability, should agree that such aid should be distributed efficiently and in a
manner which supports our-diplomatic objectives. ·In an effort to do this, I supported
proposals this past year to reorganize,our foreign policy agencies; including folding the
functions of the Agency for International Development into the State-Department. This
plan would not only increase efficiency and reduce overhead, but also end the
-separationbetween foreign aid and U.S. diplomacy. For that reason five former
Secretaries of State supported the reorganization plan, but President Clinton
nevertheless vetoed it.
,Finally, I think we have a right to demand greater efficiency· and accountability
from those international organizations that are supported by contributions from
taxpayers inthe.United States.-~ Most notable among these-is the United Nations. The
U. N. has an important role to play in the world, but there is. broad consensus that
wasteful spending, inflated salaries and benefits, and incoherent management practices
have severely limited its effectiveness. If the U.N., is going to be an effective tool for
peace-keeping and reconstruction in the world, including Bosnia, it must be reformed.
I support an approach that would withhold portions of the U.S. contribution until
reforms have been made in the U.N. 's budgeting, management, and personnel
practices. Such efforts are needed not to destroy the U.N., but rather to save it.
Through reformed and effective institutions, and increased trade,_ we can help
Bosnia and other areas of the world focus on a hopeful future, rather than a dismal
past. But 20,000 American troops do not need to be on the ground in Bosnia for us to
do that. When we call on our soldiers to risk their lives, it must only be in the service

of vital U.S. interests and their task must be well-defined. We must do so based on a
thoughtful set of principles. Without such principles, we not only unnecessarily
threaten the lives of our troops, but threaten the nation's security in days yet to come.

